Corrections Law: The Supreme Court and Treatment in Correctional and Forensic Mental Health Facilities: Recent Trends and Decisions by Perlin, Michael L.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1994
Corrections Law: The Supreme Court and
Treatment in Correctional and Forensic Mental
Health Facilities: Recent Trends and Decisions
Michael L. Perlin
New York Law School, michael.perlin@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Law and
Psychology Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
30 Criminal Law Bulletin 458–474 (1994)
Corrections Law: 
The Supreme Court and Treatment in 
Correctional and Forensic Mental 
-Health Facilities: Recent Trends and 
Decisions 
On a Perry Mason rerun on TV the 
other night, there was a scene in a 
darkroom. Paul Drake (Perry's origi-
nal investigator) had taken a picture 
of a crime scene, and was developing 
the negative. Forms and shapes began 
to emerge slowly as the blank piece 
of developing paper ''came alive,'' 
and, eventually, the viewer was able 
to see the completed picture (which, 
needless to say, gave Perry a clue that 
no one else saw). The image serves 
as a defining metaphor for this topic: 
recent trends in mental health law 
from a legal perspective: The United 
States Supreme Court continues, bit 
by bit, partial image by partial image, 
to fill in pieces of a multidimensional 
puzzle. 
This puzzle has many subcompo-
nents: the extent of the civil and con-
stitutional rights that are owed men-
tally disabled individuals facing the 
involuntary civil commitment pro-
cess; the rights owed to such persons 
during institutionalization; the rights 
owed upon release from psychiatric 
facilities; the rights owed such per-
~~ns when they are awaiting trial in 
Jail. ?~ follow.mg sentence to penal 
facil1t1es; the impact that mental dis-
* Professor, New York Law School 
New York, N. Y. An earlier version of 
this paper was presented at the annual 
California Forensic Mental Health Asso-
ciation conference, March 1993. 
By Michael L. Perlin* 
ability has on the criminal trial pro-
cess (as to such questions as the ad-
missibility of confessions made by 
severely mentally disabled individu-
als, the application of the privilege 
against self-incrimination to pretrial 
psychiatric interviews, the right to 
access to expert witnesses to assist in 
trial preparation); the limits of legal 
regulation of mental health provid-
ers; the ways that courts assess privi-
lege and/ or subordinate mental health 
professional expertise during the trial 
process; the constitutional limitations 
on incompetency to stand trial and 
insanity defense proceedings; and the 
role of mental disability in capital 
punishment decision making. 
Each year, additional pieces of this 
puzzle are filled in. 1 Sometimes, the 
impact of the real world on clinicians 
and forensic mental health profes-
sionals is fairly clear; sometimes, it 
is murkier. 2 Over the years, certain 
1 See generally Michael L. Perlin, 
· Mental Disability Law: Civil and Crimi-
nal (1989 and 1994 pocket part). 
2 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, ''De-
coding Right to Refuse Treatment Law,'' 
16 Int'l J .L. & Psychiatry 47 (1993) 
(hereinafter Perlin, "Decoding"); 
Michael L. Perlin, "Reading the Su-
preme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting 
Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal 
Right to Refuse Treatment Cases,'' 12 
Am. J. Forens. Psychiatry 37 (1991) 
(hereinafter Perlin, "Tea Leaves"); 
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baseline principles become ''burned 
in'' in a way that clarifies some of 
the Court's core values; for example, 
the Court, it is now clear, believes 
that the standard of proof in an invol-
untary civil commitment case is high-
er than in a ''typical'' civil case but 
lower than in a criminal case. 3 Other 
gaps remain, leading us to ponder 
how the Court would decide a case 
with a certain fact pattern if only it 
were to be presented: for example, 
an issue that the Court will deal with 
this term, the constitutionality of em-
ploying a different burden of proof in 
cases involving the involuntary civil 
commitment of mentally ill persons 
from that used in cases involving 
mentally retarded persons. 4 
In other areas, one can only specu-
late. Although the Court has dealt on 
the merits with questions involving 
the right of prisoners and of criminal 
defendants awaiting trial to refuse 
treatment, 5 it has sidestepped the 
same question when it arose in a case 
involving civil ·patients, 6 and has 
Michael L. Perlin, ''The Supreme Court, 
the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defen-
dant, and Symbolic Values: Random De-
cisions, Hidden Rationales, or 'Doctrinal 
Abyss' "? 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1987) 
(hereinafter Perlin, "Supreme Court"); 
Michael L. Perlin, "The United States 
Supreme Court and Mental Health Law: 
A Retrospective,'' 4 Med. & L. 49 
(1985). 
3 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418 (1979). 
4 After the presentation of this paper, 
the Supreme Court decided, in Heller v. 
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993), that such a 
differing burden of proof did not violate 
the equal protection clause. See 1 Perlin, 
note 1 supra,§ 3.39A(l994pocketpart); 
Michael L. Perlin, 1he Law and Mental 
Disability§ 1.24 (1994). 
5 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210 (1990) (prisoners); Riggins v. Neva-
da, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (defendants 
awaiting criminal trial). 
6 See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 
(1982). 
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shown no inclination to return to it. 
While it has found that juveniles are 
entitled to fewer procedural due pro-
cess rights at involuntary civil com-
mitment hearings than are adults, 7 it 
has never considered the important 
question of the scope of rights due 
to individuals facing, for example, 
outpatient commitment. 8 Whether the 
court will ever choose to address 
these questions is simply anybody's 
guess. 
Yet, in the past four years, the 
Supreme Court has chosen to decide 
five important mental disability law 
cases that have a potentially signifi-
cant impact on both clinicians and 
forensic witnesses. Each of these cas-
es is briefly discussed and its potential 
impact on the constitutional rights 
owed to individuals institutionalized 
in correctional and forensic mental 
health facilities is appraised as well 
as the potential liability of providers 
if these rights are violated. 9 
7 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 
(1979). 
8 See, e.g., 1 Perlin, note 1 supra, 
§ 3.78. 
9 See, e.g., Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent 
(D. Wexler ed., 1990); Essays in Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence (D. Wexler & B. 
Winick eds., 1991); Michael L. Perlin, 
"On 'Sanism' " 46 SMU L. Rev. 373 
(1992) (hereinafter Perlin, "Sanism"); 
Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorf-
man, "Sanism, Social Science, and the 
Development of Mental Disability Law 
Jurisprudence," 11 Behav. Sci. & L. 47 
(1993); Michael L. Perlin, "Morality 
and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: 
Of 'Ordinary Common Sense,' Heuristic 
Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance,'' 
19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 131 
(1991) (hereinafter Perlin, "Morality"); 
Michael L. Perlin, "Pretexts and Mental 
Disability Law: The Case of Compe-
tency," 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 625 (1993) 
(hereinafter Perlin, "Pretexts"); 
Michael L. Perlin, "Therapeutic Juris-
prudence: Understanding the Sanist and 
Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability 
One preliminary observation-the 
notion of ''criminalization of the 
mentally ill''-may not be helpful 
in resolving these issues. The best 
empirical research rebuts the notions 
that deinstitutionalization has had 
much of a significant impact on 
''criminalization'' and that deinsti-
tutionalization has led to the overuse 
of the incompetency-to-stand-trial 
process as a means of dealing with 
nuisance offenders, and suggests 
that, while mentally ill persons are 
frequently treated more poorly in 
many aspects of the correctional sys-
tem than are nonmentally ill persons, 
the link to deinstitutionalization poli-
cies is simply not there. 10 
The Supreme Court Cases 
In 1990, the Supreme Court turned 
to mental disability law questions on 
two separate occasions. In one deci-
sion, it considered for the first time 
on the merits of the question of the 
right of an institutionalized popula-
tion to refuse the involuntary admin-
istration of psychotropic medication; 
in the other, it turned for the first time 
to the question of the constitutional 
limitations that could be placed on the 
voluntary commitment process. 
Law,'' 20 N. Eng. J. Crim. & Civ. 
Confinement 369 (1944) (hereinafter 
Perlin, ''Pretextual Bases''). 
10 See Michael L. Perlin, "Compe-
tency, Deinstitutionalization, and Home-
lessness: A Story of Marginalization,'' 
28 Hous. L. Rev. 63, 115 n.303 (1991), 
discussing, inter alia, Thomas Arvanites, 
''The Impact of State Mental Hospital 
Deinstitutionalization on Commitments 
for Incompetency to Stand Trial,'' 26 
Criminol. 307 (1988), and Thomas Ar-
vanites, ''The Differential Impact of 
Deinstitutionalization on White and 
Nonwhite Defendants Found Incompe-
tent to Stand Trial,'' 17 Bull. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. 311 (1989). 
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Washington v. Harper 
In Washington v. Harper, 11 the 
court answered the question of 
whether a convicted prisoner could be 
forcibly medicated against his will. 
Here, the court found that the due 
process clause applied to institutional 
medication decision making, on the 
theory that prisoners possessed a 
"significant liberty interest" in 
avoiding the unwanted administra-
tion of such drugs. 12 On the other 
hand, the need to consider prison 
safety and security led it to uphold a 
state regulation limiting the prison-
er's right, as the regulation was "rea-
sonably related to legitimate penolog-
ical interests. " 13 While the question 
of drug side effects was a factor to 
consider, the Court chose to focus 
instead on the ''needs of the institu-
tion,'' including the ''safety of prison 
staff's and administrative personnel'' 
and the' 'duty to take reasonable mea-
sures for the prisoners' own 
safety.'' 14 
While providing the prisoner with 
a limited remedy, the majority in 
Harper selectively chose to stress 
those aspects of the data available on 
the effects of antipsychotic drugs that 
discussed the benefits of such medi-
cation, while at the same time ac-
knowledging but discounting the 
harmful and debilitating effects of 
these drugs. 15 Harper thus accommo-
11 494 U.S. 210(1990); see generally, 
2 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 5.64A (1994 
pocket part); Perlin, note 4 supra, 
§ 2.22. 
12 Harper, 494 U.S. at222. 
13 /d. 
1
• Id. at 223-224. 
15 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 n.5 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dis-
senting in part): 
The Court relies heavily on the Brief 
filed by the American Psychiatric 
Association et al. and the Washing-
ton State Psychiatric Association ... 
to discount the severity of these 
CORRECTIONS LAW 
dated social science evidence with 
an important strand of the Supreme 
Court's penological jurisprudence: 
''Prison security concerns will, virtu-
ally without exception, trump indi-
vidual autonomy inte_rests. '' 16 
Zinermon v. Burch 
In the other 1990 case, Zinermon 
v. Burch, 17 the Court looked at an 
entirely different issue: the interplay 
between Section 1983 civil rights 
remedies and the voluntary hospital 
admissions process. Put simply, Zin-
ermon held that a voluntary patient 
could proceed with a civil rights dam-
ages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against state hospital officials where 
he charged that those officials should 
have known that he was incompetent 
to voluntarily commit himself to the 
hospital at the time he signed volun-
tary admission forms. 18 
drugs. However, medical findings 
discussed in other briefs support con-
clusions of the Washington Supreme 
Court and challenge the reliability of 
the Psychiatrists' Brief. 
Compare e.g., id. at 230 (majority relies 
on Psychiatrists' Brief for proposition 
that tardive dyskinesia is found in 10 to 
25 percent of hospitalized patients), to 
id. at 239 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part) (chances great-
er than one in four of patient developing 
tardive dysk:inesia, and rate is 
increasing). 
In Harper, both the state and the de-
fense submitted studies discussing drug 
side effects. While both sets of studies 
acknowledged the side effects' seri-
ousness, they disagreed on how pervasive 
they were in institutional populations. 
See id. at 229. 
16 See Perlin & Dorfman, note 9 
supra, at 57. 
11 494 U.S. 113 (1990). 
18 494 U.S. 113, 130-139 (1990); see 
1 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 3.69 (1994 
pocket part) & 3 id.,§ 12.33 (1994 pock-
et part); Perlin, note 4 supra, §§ 1.33, 
3 .14; Michael L. Perlin, ''Understanding 
Zinermon v. Burch,'' in 3 Psychiatric 
In Zinermon, community mental 
health services workers had given a 
''hallucinating, confused, psychot-
ic'' patient forms to sign consenting 
to admission and treatment. He 
signed the papers, stating that he was 
signing himself "into heaven. " 19 He 
was subsequently detained for five 
months in the state hospital without a 
hearing as to the propriety of his 
hospitalization and treatment. 20 
After his civil rights action was 
dismissed, he appealed, and the Su-
preme Court reversed. In a sharply 
split opinion, it found that predepri-
vation procedural safeguards might 
have helped prevent the alleged viola-
tion of the plaintiffs liberty interest, 21 
it being foreseeable both that persons 
such as the plaintiff might be incapa-
ble of exercising informed consent to 
admission, 22 and that such depriva-
tions would occur at a ''predictable 
point'' in the admission process. 23 
Here, the burden rested on the hospi-
tal staff to ensure that the voluntary 
admission process not be violated, 
and that proper procedures be afford-
ed both to patients who were unwill-
ing to consent, and to those unable to 
execute such a consent. 24 
This complex procedural decision 
raises for the first time the concerns 
of a majority of the court as to the 
risks that some ''voluntary'' patients 
may not be competent to admit them-
selves to psychiatric facilities. 25 
Thus, writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Blackmun-generally the justice 
the most sensitive to mental health 
Malpractice Risk Management, chapter 
6 (1993). 
19 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 118, 119. 
20 Id. at 118-120. 
21 Id. at 127-130. 
22 Id. at 138-139. 
23 Id. at 134-137. 
24 Id. at 130-139. 
"Id. at 132-135. 
• 26 issues -noted that ''the very nature 
of mental illness'' makes it ''foresee-
able" that such a person "will be 
unable to understand any proferred 
'explanation and disclosure of the 
subject matter' of the forms that a 
person is asked to sign, and will be 
unable 'to make a knowing and will-
ful decision' whether to consent to 
admission. ''27 
Mental illness, he added, created 
''special problems'' regarding in-
formed consent, suggesting that the 
state might not be justified in ''taking 
at face value'' a mentally ill person's 
request for admission and treatment 
at a mental hospital. 28 As a person 
incapable of making an informed de-
cision is similarly likely to be unable 
to benefit from a voluntary patient's 
right to request discharge,29 such a 
person would be in danger of being 
confined indefinitely without benefit 
of the procedural safeguards inherent 
in the involuntary placement process, 
26 See Gary Melton, ''Realism in Psy-
chology and Humanism in Law: Psy-
cholegal Studies at Nebraska," 69 Neb. 
L. Rev. 251, 272-273 (1990). 
27 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133 (empha-
sis added) (quoting Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 394.455(22) (1981). Compare Loukas 
v. Hofbauer, 784 F. Supp. 377, 382 
(E.D. Mich. 1991) ("A state official's 
failure to commence in a timely fashion 
a hearing when a prisoner is classified 
for administrative segregation is not as 
~redictable as the incompetence of a pa-
?ent from whom an official is seeking 
mformed consent for admission to a state 
mental hospital''; while Zinermon analy-
sis is.' 'ambiguous," predeprivation pro-
ces.s is required in prison inmate classifi-
cation case). 
28 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133 n.18. 
29 Id. at 133 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 394.465(2)(a)(1981). Compare Strei-
cher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 
(l:~.D.C:. 1987) ~no~ a single patient com-
rrutted m the District of Columbia over 
twenty-~w~-~ear ~riod exercised rights 
to seek Judicial review of commitment). 
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a process that was ''specifically de-
signed to protect persons incapable of 
looking out for their own interests.' '30 
Riggins v. Nevada 
The Court's decision to grant cer-
tiorari in Riggins v. Nevada pre-
sented this question: Did the involun-
tary administration of antipsychotic 
drugs to a criminal defendant during 
the pendency of his trial violate his 
ri~h.t to a fair trial by impeding his 
ability to consult with counsel, by 
interfering with the content of his own 
testimony, or by negatively affecting 
his capacity to follow the proceed-
ings?31 
While in jail on murder charges, 
Riggins told a jail psychiatrist that he 
was ''hearing voices in his head and 
having trouble sleeping,'' and in-
formed him that, in the past, he had 
been prescribed the antipsychotic 
drug Mellaril. 32 The psychiatrist then 
prescribed Mellaril, and subse-
quently increased the dosage to 800 
mgs. per day, an unusually large 
amount. 33 The defendant subse-
quently sought a court order that 
would have terminated the adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs during 
the pendency of the trial, on the theo-
30 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133. 
31 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814 (1992). See 
generally, 2 Perlin, note 1 supra, 
§ 5.65A (1994 pocket part); Perlin, note 
4supra, § 2.18. 
32 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812. 
33 See id. at 1816 (800 mgs. within the 
"toxic range"); see also, id. at 1819 
(Kennedy, J. , concurring) (expert testi-
fied that 800 mgs. was a sufficient dosage 
to "tranquilize an elephant"). Other ex-
perts testified that the drug could make 
the defendant ''uptight,'' or could cause 
"drowsiness or confusion"; as amicus, 
the American Psychiatric Association 
stated that, in extreme cases, the sedative 
properties of the drug might even ''affect 
thought processes." Id. at 1816. 
ry that, as he was prof erring an insan-
ity defense, he had a right to have 
the jury see him in ''his true mental 
state.' ' 34 After hearing conflicting ex-
pert testimony, 35 the trial judge de-
nied defendant's motion. 36 
Defendant presented an insanity 
defense at trial, and testified that 
''voices in his head'' had told him that 
killing the victim would be justifiable 
homicide. 37 He was found guilty and 
sentenced to death. 38 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court, in 1992, reversed. 
While it presumed that the adminis-
tration of the drugs was ''medically 
appropriate,' ' 39 it weighed whether 
that administration, nevertheless, de-
prived the defendant of a fair trial. 40 
In answering this question, it turned 
first to the conclusion in Harper that 
''the forcible injection of medication 
into a nonconsenting person's body 
represents a substantial interference 
34 Id. On the ways that jurors make 
stereotypic assumptions about mentally 
disabled individuals based on visual im-
agery, see e.g. , Michael L. Perlin, "Psy-
chodynamics and the Insanity Defense: 
'Ordinary Common Sense' and Heuristic 
Reasoning," 69 Neb. L. Rev. 3 (1990); 
Michael L. Perlin, ''Unpacking the 
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of 
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,'' 40 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599 (1989- 1990) 
(hereinafter Perlin, "Myths"); Perlin, 
"Sanism," note 9 supra; see generally, 
Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of 
the Insanity Defense ( 1994) (hereinafter 
Perlin, Jurisprudence). 
3~ See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813. 
36 Id. By this time, Riggins was receiv-
ing 800 mgs. again. Id. 
31 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1814. 
40 Because the issue was not preserved 
below, the Court declined to rule on the 
question of whether the drugging violated 
Riggins' s Eighth Amendment right to 
show the jurors his true mental condition 
at his sentencing hearing. Id. 
463 
with that person's liberty,' '41 and fo-
cused on Harper's discussion of such 
drugs' side effects. 42 As Harper 
found forced drugging of a convicted 
prisoner impermissible absent a find-
ing of overriding justification, ''43 a 
pretrial detainee (such as Riggins) 
would be entitled to ''at least as much 
protection.' '44 
Although the Court did not set 
down a bright-line test articulating 
the state's burden in sustaining forced 
drugging of a detainee at trial, it 
found that this burden would be met 
had the state demonstrated medical 
appropriateness and consideration of 
less intrusive alternatives, either (1) 
''essential for the sake of Riggins' 
own safety or the safety of others,'' 
or (2) a lack of less intrusive means 
by which to obtain an adjudication of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence. 45 
It noted further that it was not decid-
ing whether a competent criminal de-
fendant could refuse drugs if the ces-
sation of such medications would 
make him incompetent to stand trial. 46 
The error below may well have 
impaired the defendant's trial rights, 
the majority found. The drugs' side 
41 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814 (quoting 
Harper, 494 U.S. at229). 
42 See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814-
1815 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-
230). 
43 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. 
44 Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 545 (1979); O'Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). 
4~ Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. 
46 Id. Questions involving the compe-
tency determination process are dis-
cussed in United States v. Charters, 863 
F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
494 U.S. 1016 (1990); see generally, 
Michael L. Perlin, ''Are Courts Compe-
tent to Decide Competency Questions? 
Stripping the Facade from United States 
v. Charters,'' 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 957 
(1990). 
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effects might have affected not just 
the defendant's outward appearance, 
but also ''the content of his testimo-
ny . . . , his ability to follow the 
proceedings, or the substance of his 
communication with counsel. ''47 Fi-
nally, it concluded that allowing the 
defendant to present expert testimony 
to explain the side effects could not 
possibly be curative of the possibility 
that defendant's own testimony, his 
interaction with counsel, or his trial 
comprehension were compromised 
by the drugs, and even with this testi-
monial assistance, an ''unacceptable 
risk of prejudice remained.' ' 48 
Justice Kennedy (the author of 
Harper) concurred, taking a stronger 
antidrugging position than did the 
majority. Focusing carefully and ex-
tensively on the potential for side 
effects, he wrote that he would not 
allow the use of antipsychotic medi-
cation to make a defendant competent 
to stand trial "absent an extraordi-
nary showing'' on the state's part, 
and noted further that he doubted this 
showing could be made ''given our 
present understanding of the proper-
ties of these drugs. ' '49 In discussing 
the side effects, Justice Kennedy con-
centrated on their potential impact 
on defendant's fair trial rights, their 
alteration of his demeanor in a way 
that ''will prejudice his reactions and 
presentation in the courtroom,'' and 
their rendering him ''unable or un-
willing'' to assist counsel. so If the 
medication inhibits the defendant's 
capacity to react to the proceedings 
and to demonstrate ''remorse or com-
passion,'' the prejudice suffered by 
defendant can be especially acute at 
the sentencing stage. st 
47 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. 1816. 
•a Id. 
49 Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J. , concur-
ring). 
'°Id. at 1818-1819. 
si Id. at 1819-1820 (citing William 
Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, "Why 
Coming so soon after the decision 
in Harper, Riggins is somewhat sur-
prising. s2 It differs importantly from 
Harper in that the court treated Harp-
er as a prison security case, while it 
read Riggins as a fair trial case; yet, 
this difference in the litigants' legal 
status self-evidently has no effect on 
the physiological or neurological po-
tential impact of the drugs in ques-
tion. s3 Nevertheless, the side-effects 
language in Harper (subordinated 
there because of security reasons) is 
emphasized in Riggins (where such 
issues are absent) by nature of the 
Court's consideration of the question 
in the context of a fair trial question. 
Riggins' use of ''less intrusive al-
ternatives'' language is especially 
surprising. Since the Supreme Court 
chose to bypass this construction in 
Youngberg v. Romeos4 and to use in 
its place the phrase ''reasonably non-
restrictive confmement conditions' 'ss 
as part of its articulation of a ''sub-
stantial professional judgment'' 
test, s6 it has appeared that there was 
simply no place for this doctrine in 
mental disability law. s7 Riggins has 
given it new life in the context of a 
criminal case, and it will thus be 
necessary for litigators and judges to 
Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative 
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty 
Cases," 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 51-
53 (1987-1988)) (assessment ofremorse 
may be dispositive factor to jurors in 
death penalty cases). 
s2 See Perlin & Dorfman, note 9 
supra, at 57-58. 
s3 Compare Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 
1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring), stress-
ing "litigational" side effects. 
54 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
ss Id. at 324; see generally 2 Perlin, 
note 1 supra, § 4.36. 
56 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-323; 
see generally 2 Perlin, note 1 supra, 
§ 4.35. 
s7 See 2 Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 4.39. 
rethink the potential reapplication of 
the "less intrusive means" or "least 
restrictive alternative'' test in subse-
quent federal constitutional litiga-
tion.58 
Foucha v. Louisiana 
Foucha v. Louisiana., the second 
1992 case, presented an appeal from 
a state case that had upheld the contin-
ued postinsanity acquittal of a defen-
dant who had been found to be no 
longer mentally ill but who might 
potentially still be dangerous. 59 At the 
hearing below, no expert had testified 
''positively'' that Foucha would be a 
danger if he were to be released; one 
witness stated, ''I don't think I would 
feel comfortable in certifying that he 
was not a danJer to himself or to 
other people.'' 
In a sharply split opinion, the Su-
preme Court, per Justice White, re-
versed. Since the basis for holding 
Foucha in a hospital as an insanity 
acquittee had disappeared, the Court 
found the state could no longer hold 
him on that basis,61 relying on its 
opinion in 0 'Connor v. Doooldson62 
for the proposition that, once the basis 
for a constitutionally permissible 
commitment disappeared, an individ-
ual could no longer be institutional-
ized. 
" See M. Perlin, "Law as a Therapeu-
tic and Anti-Therapeutic Agent'' (paper 
presented at the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Mental Health's Division of Fo-
rensic Mental Health's annual confer-
ence, Auburn, Mass. (May 1992), at 9 
(discussing these implications of Rig-
gins)). 
59 State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138 
(La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 
(1992); see generally 3 Perlin, note 1 
supra, § 15.25A (1994 pocket part); Per-
lin, note 4 supra, §§ 4, 38. 
60 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786. 
61 Id. at 1784. 
62 422 U.S. 563, 574-575 (1975); see 
1 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 2.12. 
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It rejected on three different bases 
the state's argument that Foucha's 
antipersonality diagnosis provided a 
. permissible rationale for further insti-
. tutionalization. First, Foucha could 
not be civilly committed as currently 
mentally ill and dangerous, since an-
tisocial personality disorder is not 
viewed as a "mental illness. " 63 Sec-
ond, the Court found that if he could 
no longer be held as an insanity ac-
quittee, he was entitled to constitu-
tionally adequate procedures to estab-
lish permissible grounds for his 
confinement. 64 Finally, stressing the 
''fundamental nature'' of the individ-
ual's "right to . liberty, " 65 the Court 
concluded that Foucha-who had 
never been convicted of a crime-
could not be punished. 66 The state had 
not shown, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the defendant was 
mentally ill and dangerous, and 
Foucha could thus no longer be kept 
institutionalized; the testimony ad-
duced below was an insufficient basis 
for such a finding. 67 
Justice O'Connor concurred, and 
Justice Kennedy dissented in an opin-
ion joined by the Chief Justice, ar-
guing that, notwithstanding the jury's 
verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity in Foucha' s underlying crim-
· inal trial, the case did not differ sub-
stantially from one in which a defen-
. dant had been convicted of the 
precedent crime, and that earlier civil 
cases relied on by the majority (such 
as O'Connor and Addington v. Tex-
63 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784-1785. 
64 Id. at 1785. 
65 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 
307, 316 (1982); Untied States v. Saler-
no, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 
66 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (citing 
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 
369 (1983)). 
67 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786. 
as)68 should thus be inapplicable, 69 
characterizing the distinction be-
tween a ''not guilty by reason of 
insanity" (NORI) and a "guilty but 
mentally ill'' (GBMI) verdict as a 
trivial "choice of nomenclature. " 70 
Justice Thomas also dissented in 
an opinion joined by the Chief Justice 
and Justice Scalia. He focused at 
some length on the possibility of 
''calculated abuse of the .insanity de-
fense'' by defendants who might 
feign the plea, and speculated as to 
how the public might react to the 
specter of a ''serial killer ... returned 
to the streets immediately after 
trial. ,,71 
Medina v. California 
The final 1992 Supreme Court 
case, Medina. v. California, 72 dealt 
with what might appear at first blush 
simply a narrow legal question: 
whether placement of the burden of 
proof on the defendant at an incompe-
tency to stand trial proceeding vio-
lates due process. However, this case 
also has potentially important impli-
cations for forensic witnesses and cli-
nicians. 
Medina was jailed after being ar-
rested on multiple murder counts. 
His counsel moved for a competency 
hearing on the grounds that he was 
unsure whether the defendant had the 
abili~ to participate in the proceed-
ings. Medina was found competent 
61 441 U.S. 418 (1979)( clear and con-
vincing evidence required burden of 
proof in civil commitment hearing). 
69 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1793-1794 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
10 Id. at 1793. 
11 Id. at 1801-1802; see also id. at 
1797 (Kennedy, J. , dissenting). 
72 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992); see general-
ly 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 14.05A (1994 
pocket part); Perlin, note 4 supra, 
§ 4.06. 
13 •1d. at 2574. 
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based on a local statute that the defen-
dant bore the burden of proof to show 
incompetency. 74 He was tried, con-
victed, and sentenced to death. 75 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court af-
firmed.76 
It rejected defendant's argument 
that fundamental fairness required 
that the burden of proof be allocated 
to the state. 77 On the other hand, it 
conceded that an impaired defendant 
might be limited in his ability to assist 
counsel in demonstrating incompe-
tence, although that inability, by it-
self, might constitute probative evi-
dence of incompetence, noting 
further that defense counsel will often 
have ''the best informed view'' of the 
defendant's ability to participate in 
his defense. 78 
Justice O'Connor concurred (on 
behalf of herself and Justice Souter), 
expressing concern that defendants 
will feign incompetence, and that the 
placement of the burden on the defen-
dant may have a prophylactic effect 
by ensuring that the greatest amount 
of available information as to the de-
fendant's mental condition is before 
the court. 79 
Justice Blackmun dissented (on be-
half of himself and Justice Stevens). 
He stressed language in Drope v. 
Missouri that the right to be tried 
while competent is ''fundamental'' to 
the adversary system of justice, 80 and 
added that the right to be tried while 
competent was the "foundational 
right' ' for the effective exercise of all 
other criminal trial process rights. 81 
74 Id. at 2575. 
1S Id. 
76 Id. at 2576. 
77 Id. at 2577-2578. 
78 Id. at 2580. 
79 Id. at 2582-2583 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
80 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). 
81 Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2583 (Black- · 
mun, J., dissenting). 
The fact that, in cases where the 
evidence is inconclusive, a defendant 
may be subjected to trial introduces a 
''systematic and unacceptably high 
risk'' that persons will be tried and 
convicted ''who are unable to follow 
or participate in the proceedings de-
termining their fate. ''82 In addition, 
Justice Blackmun concluded that the 
court's confidence in defense coun-
sel's role was misplaced. First, the 
state generally has much better direct 
access to pretrial defendants, espe-
cially those like Medina who awaited 
trial under locked psychiatric security 
observation. Second, psychiatric tes-
timony is generally dispositive . at 
competency hearings; in over 90 per-
ent of cases, courts agree with expert 
conclusions. Experts' opinions are 
thus generally privileged over those 
of trial counsel. 83 
The Impact of the Cases 
As a result of these cases, one can 
be fairly sure about the following 
propositions. First, persons who are 
not mentally ill can no longer be 
constitutionally detained in forensic 
mental health facilities. This holding 
of Foucha seems to be crystal clear 
and nonnegotiable (unless, of course, 
there is a change in personnel on the 
Court, and the new Court chooses to 
consider the issue once again). 
Second, any decision to medicate 
a defendant awaiting trial must be 
thought out very carefully, and the 
entire question of drugging-to-make 
competent needs to be carefully reex-
amined. While the Riggins case did 
not address this latter question (since 
it was not preserved correctly on ap-
peal), the majority's language (and 
the even more emphatic concurring 
opinion by Justice Kennedy) clarifies 
the Court's concern about this entire 
area. 
82 Id. at 2587-2588. 
83 Id. 
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Third, there can no longer be any 
question that procedural due process 
protections apply to institutional 
drugging questions. Even though the 
plaintiff in Harper was unsuccessful, 
the principles embedded in the case 
were employed by the court to find 
in Riggins' favor. Also, it is axiomat-
ic that civil patients cannot have fewer 
constitutional rights than convicted 
prisoners, so it seems that Harper is 
the final word on the debate over 
whether or not a constitutional right 
to refuse applies to civil hospitals . It 
clearly does. 
Fourth, there is now no longer any 
question that the Section 1983 civil 
rights relief is available as a litigation 
tool to individuals seeking to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of their confine-
ment, no matter what their commit-
ment category. Zinermon clarifies 
this, and it is inconceivable to me that 
a lower court might reject this finding 
in a case involving a person facing 
involuntary civil commitment. 
It is possible that Medina may re-
sult in an increased number of seri-
ously mentally ill persons in jails and 
prisons. If the decision's result is 
that fewer "borderline" defendants 
(borderline in the lay sense, not in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
sense) are found incompetent to stand 
trial, then it is likely that they will 
be tried, convicted, and imprisoned. 
This may, in time, make institutional 
management of correctional facilities 
more difficult. 
Perhaps the most revealing aspect 
of Medina is Justice O'Connor's con-
currence. O'Connor, who wrote the 
majority in Riggins, focuses on her 
major concern and rationale: that de-
fendants may seek to feign incompe-
tency to stand trial, and that place-
ment of the burden of proof on the 
defendant may lessen the likelihood 
of such a defendant's success. This 
"fear of feigning" is reflected both 
in Justice Kennedy's arid Justice 
Thomas' s dissents in Foucha as well, 
and remains one of the dominating 
principles of the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence int his area, 84 in spite 
of uncontradicted evidence that such 
malingering is statistically rare and 
virtually never successful in prac-
tice. 85 
Foucha may result in states' 
amending statutes to define ''mental 
illness'' so as to include antisocial 
personality disorder, which was Ter-
ry Foucha's diagnosis. The dilemma 
h~re is an interesting one: Many 
states, such as Louisiana, amended 
their insanity defense statutes to make 
sure that Anti-Social Personality Dis-
order (ASPD) defendants could not 
avail themselves of an insanity plea. 
Was the state "hoist by its own pe-
tard" in Foucha? Will legislatures 
now feel that the risk of an occasional 
extra insanity acquitee is less 
troubling than the risk that a danger-
ous individual might be released from 
all custodial restraints? 
Will Foucha lead to the creation of 
an intermediate type of facility for 
''dangerous-but-no-longer-mentally-
ill" individuals? Would the creation 
of such a facility be constitutionally 
permissible? Is Foucha-who had 
been involved in several altercations 
with other patients while institution-
alized86-exculpated, by reason of the 
NORI verdict, from taking responsi-
bility for what would otherwise be 
considered criminal acts committed 
at a forensic facility? Does it make 
sense to prosecute such cases? 
14 See generally Perlin, "Myths," 
note 34 supra; Perlin, Jurisprudence, 
note 34 supra. 
85 See e.g., David Schretlen & Hal 
Arkowitz, ''A Psychological Test Bat-
tery to Detect Prison Inmates Who Fake 
· Insanity or Mental Retardation '' 8 Be-
hav. Sci. ~ L. 75 (1990) (92 to 9S percent 
of all subjects correctly classified as ei-
ther faking or not faking). 
16 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782-
1783. 
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What will be the fallout of Justice 
Thomas' s focus on the worst fears 
about insanity acquittees....,-that they 
"faked" the insanity defense in the 
first place and that the improper use 
of the defense will allow for the 
speedy release of serial killers? His 
opinion profoundly demonstrates the 
degree to which judges can distort 
social science evidence. Again, the 
empirical data is clear that the inSani-
ty defense is rarely feigned, that such 
attempts are invariably ''seen 
through'' by fact finders, and that 
"successful" acquittees are general-
ly institutionalized in maximum secu-
rity facilities for far longer periods 
than they would have been incarcerat-
ed in penal facilities had they been 
convicted of the predicate crimes. 87 
His reference to ''serial killers'' is 
even more perplexing here, given the 
fact that Foucha' s underlying charges 
were burglary and firearms of-
fenses.88 
Harper and Riggins together may 
lead to more right to refuse litigation 
being brought by "other popula-
tions'': Defendants awaiting incom-
petency to stand trial determinations; 
defendants found pennanently in-
competent to stand trial under Jack-
son v. lndiana,89 defendants found 
NGRI.90 Riggins may also lead to a 
closer look at all questions involving 
the involuntary administration of 
medication in jails, and may even 
begin to stem the ten-year exodus of 
right-to-refuse-treatment cases from 
federal court to state courts. 91 
17 See Perlin, "Myths," note 34 
supra, at 646-655, and Perlin Jurispru-
dence, note 34 supra, at 111-112 (citing 
empirical studies and sources). 
18 Id. at 1782. 
89 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
90 See Perlin, ''Tea Leaves,'' note 2 
supra; Perlin, "Decoding," note 2 
supra. 
91 See Michael L. Perlin, Riggins v. 
Nevada: Forced Medication Collides 
Finally, Zinermon may lead the 
states to mandate some sort of due 
process hearing prior to the accep-
tance of any voluntary application for 
admissions. New Jersey, for in-
stance, has amended its court rules to 
provide for hearings when a patient 
wishes to convert from voluntary to 
involuntary status.92 Will such hear-
ings simply be, in former Chief Jus-
tice Burger's famous phrase, "time-
consuming procedural minuets''; 93 
will they serve to insulate clinicians 
from constitutional tort liability; or 
will they serve as a meaningful check 
to make sure that individuals like the 
plaintiff in Zinermon-who thought 
he was signing himself into ''heav-
en" -not be improperly admitted to 
psychiatric hospitals without some 
measure of due process? 
None of this will have any impact 
if mentally disabled individuals are 
not afforded adequate counsel both 
in civil and criminal matters. The 
majority opinion in Medina, for ex-
ample, seems to be silently premised 
on the faulty assumption that ade-
quate counsel is available to defen-
dants seeking to contest their trial 
competency. All empirical surveys 
With the Right to a Fair Trial,'' 17 News-
letter Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 81, 82 
(1992). 
92 In such cases, ''the court shall hold 
a hearing within twenty days to determine 
whether the patient had the capacity to 
make an informed decision to convert to 
voluntary status and whether the decision 
was made knowingly and voluntarily,'' 
providing that counsel ''previously ap-
pointed" shall represent the patient at 
such a hearing. N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(g)(l) 
(1990). 
93 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605-
606 (1979); but see Michael L. Perlin, 
''An Invitation to the Dance: An Empiri-
cal Response to Chief Justice Warren 
Burger's 'Time-Consuming Procedural 
Minuets' Theory in Parham v. J. R. , '' 9 
Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 149, 
152 (1981). 
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have concluded that this is simply not 
so, and that counsel made available 
to mentally disabled criminal defen-
dants is regularly substandard. 94 The 
quality of counsel remains the single 
most important factor in the disposi-
tion of cases involving mentally disa-
bled criminal defendants, 95 and where 
this counsel is absent, the results are 
predictable. The fact that thirteen 
years after the court's decision in 
Jackson, almost half of the states had 
failed to implement it bespeaks the 
inadequacy of counsel in this area. 96 
Impact on Correctional Mental 
Health Services 
A brief summary of the expec.ted 
impact of these cases on two specific 
questions is in order: the extent of the 
constitutional rights owed to individ-
uals institutionalized in correctional 
mental health facilities, and the po-
tential liability of ~roviders if these 
rights are violated. 7 
First, nothing in any of these cases 
deals directly with the issue resolved 
by the Supreme Court in 1976 in 
Estelle v. Gamble-that the govern-
ment is obligated to provide medical 
care to those it incarcerates. 98 After 
94 See generally Michael L. Perlin, 
''Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Role of Counsel in Mental 
Disability Cases," 16 Law & Hum. Be-
hav. 39 (1992); Michael L. Perlin & 
Robert L. Sadoff, "Ethical Issues in the 
Representation oflndividuals in the Com-
mitment Process,'' 45 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 161(Summer1982). 
9
' See 2 Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 8.02. 
96 Bruce Winick, "Restructuring 
Competency to Stand Trial,'' 32 UCLA 
L. Rev. 921, 940 (1985). 
97 For comprehensive recent surveys, 
see Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, "In-
mates With Mental Disorders: A Guide 
to Law and Practice," 16 Ment. & Phys. 
Dis. L. Rep. 339, 462 (1992). 
98 422 U.S. 97, 104 (1~76); see 3 
Perlin, note 1 supra, § 16.22; Perlin, 
note 4 supra, § 4.44. 
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several post-Gamble cases expanded 
this concept to include a limited right 
to mental health care, 99 subsequent 
cases, decided after the Supreme 
Court's 1982 Youngberg opinion that 
articulated the ''subsequent profes-
sional judgment standard,'' were far 
more cautious in mandating such ser-
vices. 100 The question that must be 
pondered here is whether the Riggins 
decision use of ''least intrusive 
means" language in any way augurs 
a potential shift away from the profes-
sional judgment standard of Young-
berg. It is simply too early to tell. 
On the question of liability, it is 
necessary to tum to Zinermon. This 
case expands the Section 1983 civil 
rights liability in an area where most 
of the Supreme Court's other recent 
decisions had made it more difficult 
to maintain suit in cases involvinf. 
tortious acts of state employees. 1 1 
Neither the majority nor the dissent 
appears to countenance the actions of 
the state defendants in Zinermon, and 
there is no reason to assume that the 
decision was strictly an idiosyncratic 
one limited to its own facts. Although 
successful civil rights suits on behalf 
of mentally disabled plaintiffs are still 
rare, 102 the Zinermon decision cer-
tainly makes it likely that there will be 
at least a modest upsurge in damages 
litigation in this area in the future. 
99 See, e.g., Bowring v. Godwin, 551 
F .2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); Inmates of Alle-
gheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 
754 (3d Cir. 1979). 
100 See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 
F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982); Capps v. 
Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894 (D. Or. 1982). 
101 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327 (1986); see generally Susan 
Bandes, "Monnell, Pa"att, Daniels and 
Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or 
Policy From a Random, Unauthorized 
Act," 72 Iowa L. Rev. 101 ( 1986). 
1
0'2 See 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 12.25 
(collecting cases); Perlin, note 4 supra, 
§ 3.14 (same). 
Foucha also flags important liability 
issues. The Court's decision seems 
almost a cue bid, making it clear to 
litigators in states with Louisiana-like 
statutes that nonmentally ill insanity 
acquittees can no longer be held in 
forensic facilities. Clearly, there are 
liability implications here as well. 
Conclusion 
Finally, a word about some alter-
native academic approaches that may 
help shed new light on some of these 
issues. Researchers and scholars 
have been using a series of constructs 
to help illuminate this answer, such 
as heuristics, sanism, and pretextu-
ality .103 
"Heuristics" is a cognitive psy-
chology construct that refers to ~­
plicit thinking devices that individu-
als use to oversimplify complex, 
information-processing tasks. The 
vivid case is remembered and made 
representative of the whole universe 
of cases; information is processed 
to "fit'.' preexisting pictures of the 
subject matter in question; we listen 
to evidence that confirms our views, 
and reject evidence that might force 
us to reconsider; we ''ignore or mis-
use items of rationally useful infor-
mation. '' 104 
"Sanism" is an irrational preju-
dice of the same quality and character 
of other irrational prejudices that 
cause (and are reflected in) prevailing 
social attitudes of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. ios It 
infects both our jurisprudence and 
our lawyering practices. Sanism is 
largely invisible and largely socially 
acceptable. It is based largely on ste-
103 For a similar approach, see, e.g., 
Perlin, "Decoding," note 2 supra (right 
to refuse treatment). 
104 See, e.g. , Perlin, note 46 supra, at 
966~.46. 
1°' The classic study is G. Allport, The 
Nature of Prejudice (1955). 
reotype, myth, superstition, and 
deindividualization, and is sustained 
and perpetuated by our use of false 
"ordinary common sense" and heu-
ristic reasoning in an unconscious re-
sponse to events both in everyday life 
and in the legal process. 106 
The entire relationship between the 
legal process and mentally disabled 
litigants is often pietextual. Courts 
accept (either implicitly or explicitly) 
testimonial dishonesty and engage 
similarly in dishonest (frequently 
meretricius) decision making, 107 spe-
cifically where witnesses, especially 
expert witnesses, show a ''high pro-
pensity to purposely distort their tes-
timony in order to achieve desired 
ends. " 108 
Finally, ''therapeutic jurispru-
dence'' studies the role of the law as a 
therapeutic agent. 109 This perspective 
recognizes that substantive rules, le-
gal procedures, and lawyers' roles 
may have either therapeutic or 
antitherapeutic consequences, and 
questions whether such rules, proce-
dures, and roles can or should be 
reshaped so as to enhance their thera-
106 See generally Perlin, "Sanism," 
note 9 supra; Perlin & Dorfman, note 9 
supra; see also Michael L. Perlin, "The 
Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty 
Cases: The Puzzling Role of 'Mitigating' 
Mental Disability Evidence,'' 8 Notre 
DameJLEthics&Pub. Pol'y239(1994). 
107 See Perlin, "Morality," note 9 
supra, at 133; see generally Perlin, "Pre-
texts," note 9 supra; Perlin, "Pretextual 
Bases,'' note 9 supra. 
108 Charles Sevilla, ''The Exclusion-
ary Rule and Police Perjury,'' 11 San 
Diego L. Rev. 839, 840 (1974). 
109 See D. Wexler, note 9 supra; D. 
Wexler & B. Winick, note 9 supra; David 
Wexler, ''Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholar-
ship," 11 Behav. Sci. & L. 17 (1993); 
David Wexler, "Putting Mental Health 
in Mental Health Law,'' 16 Law & Hum. 
Behav. 27 (1992). 
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peutic potential, while not subordi-
nating due process principles. 110 
While an impressive body oflitera-
ture has been produced, there has not 
yet been a systematic investigation 
into the reasons why some courts 
decide cases ''therapeutically'' and 
others ''antitherapeutically. '' One 
could conclude that sanism is such a 
dominant psychological force that it 
(1) distorts "rational" decision mak-
ing; (2) encourages (albeit on at least 
a partially unconscious level) pre-
textuality; and (3) prevents decision 
makers from intelligently and coher-
ently focusing on questions that are 
meaningful to therapeutic jurispru-
dential inquiries. 111 
A reconsideration of the Supreme 
Court cases using these filters might 
help bring some coherence to any 
area that has been, for many years, a 
"doctrinal abyss, " 112 and might fill 
in a few more pieces of the puzzle. 
Postscript 
In the 1992 term, the Supreme 
Court's ''doctrinal abyss'' deep-
ened. 113 In Godinez v. Moran, 114 it 
110 David Wexler, "Health Care Com-
pliance Principles and the Insanity Ac-
quittee Conditional Release Process,'' 27 
Crim. L. Bull. 18, 19 n.5 (1991). 
111 See M. Perlin, note 58 supra (sug-
gesting that influence of sanism must be 
considered in therapeutic jurisprudence 
investigations); Michael L. Perlin, 
"What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?" 
10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 623 (1993) 
(same); Perlin, "Pretextual Bases," note 
9 supra (same). Michael L. Perlin, 
"Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Under-
standing the Sanist and Pretextual Bases 
of Mental Disability Law," 19 N. Eng. 
J. Crim. & Civ. Confinement (1994) (in 
press) (same). 
112 See Perlin, "Supreme Court," 
note 2 supra. 
113 See generally 3 Perlin, note 1 
supra, § 14.20A (1994 pocket part); Per-
lin, note 4 supra,§ 4.13. 
11
• 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993). 
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addressed a question over which the 
lower courts had split: Was there 
a higher standard of competency to 
plead guilty than to stand trial? 11 5 It 
ended the controversy by holding that 
the standard for pleading guilty was 
no higher than for standing trial. 116 
In earlier proceedings, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had re-
versed a district court denial of Mor-
an's application for a writ of habeas 
corpus, concluding that the trial re-
cord should have led the trial court to 
' 'entertain a good faith doubt about 
[Moran's] competency to make a vol-
untary, knowing , and intelligent 
waiver,' ' and that waiver of constitu-
tional rights required a ' 'higher level 
of mental functioning than that re-
quired to stand trial,'' a level it char-
acterized as ''the capacity for 'rea-
soned choice. ' " 117 The Supreme 
Court reversed, per Justice Thomas, 
rejecting the notion that competence 
to plead guilty must be measured by 
a higher (or even different) standard 
from that used in competency-to-
stand.:.trial cases. 118 
It reasoned that a defendant who 
was found competent to stand trial 
would have to make a variety of deci-
sions requiring choices: whether to 
testify, whether to seek a jury trial, 
whether to cross-examine his accus-
ers, and, in some cases , whether to 
m See 3 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 14.20 
(discussing cases). 
116 After Moran was found competent 
to stand trial, he discharged his counsel 
and pied guilty (explaining that he wanted 
to prevent the presentation of mitigating 
evidence at his sentencing) , id. at 2683, 
the court accepted his guilty plea, finding 
that it had been " freely and voluntarily" 
given. Id. He was subsequently sentenced 
to death. Id. 
117 Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 
165- 167 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. 
Ct. 2680 (1993). 
118 Godinez , 113 S. Ct. at 2682. 
raise an affirmative defense. 119 While 
the decision to plead guilty is a ''pro-
found one," "it is no more compli-
cated than the sum total of decisions 
that a defendant may be called upon to 
make during the course of a trial.' ' 120 
Finally, the court reaffirmed that any 
waiver of constitutional rights must 
be "knowing and voluntary. " 121 
It concluded on this point: 
Requiring that a criminal defen-
dant be competent has a modest 
aim: It seeks to ensure that he has 
the capacity to understand the pro-
ceedings and to assist counsel. 
While psychiatrists and scholars 
may find it useful to classify the 
various kinds and degrees of com-
petence, and while States are free 
to adopt competency standards ·that 
are more elaborate than the Dusky 
formulation, the Due Process 
Clause does not impose these addi-
tional requirements. 122 
Justices Kennedy and Scalia con-
curred, noting their concern with 
those aspects of the opinion that com-
pared the decisions made by a defen-
dant who pleads guilty with those 
made by one who goes to trial, and 
expressing their ''serious doubts'' 
that there would be a ·heightened com-
petency standard under the Due Pro-
cess clause if these decisions were 
not equivalent. 123 
119 Id. at 2686. 
i20 Id. 
121 Id. at 2687 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 
113 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1992)). 
122 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at2688 (citing, 
in a cf. reference, Medina v. California, 
112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992). In Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), the 
Supreme Court set down the substantive 
test for competency to stand trial. See 
Perlin, note 4 supra,§ 4.04. 
123 Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688 (em-
phasis added). 
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Justice Blackmun dissented (for 
himself and Justice Stevens), focus-
ing squarely on what he saw as the 
likely potential that Moran's decision 
to plead guilty was the product of 
''medication and mental illness. '' 124 
He reviewed the expert testimony as 
to the defendant's state of depression, 
a colloquy between the defendant and 
the trial judge in which the court 
was informed that the defendant was 
being given medication, the trial 
judge's failure to inquire further and 
discover the psychoactive properties 
of the drugs in question, the defen-
dant's subsequent testimony as to the 
"numbing" state of the drugs, and 
the "mechanical character" and 
"ambiguity" of the defendant's an-
swers to the court's questions at the 
plea stage. 125 
On the question of the multiple 
meanings of competency, Justice 
Blackmun added: 
[T]he majority cannot isolate the 
term' 'competent'' and apply it in a 
vacuum, divorced from its specific 
context. A person who is ''compe-
tent' ' to play basketball is not 
thereby "competent" to play the 
violin. The majority's monolithic 
approach to competency is true to 
neither life or the law. Compe-
tency for one purpose does not 
necessarily translate to compe-
th 126 tency for ano er purpose. 
124 Id. at 2692. 
125 Id. at 2692-2693. See also id. at 
2696 ("such drugs often possess side 
effects that may 'compromise the right of 
a medicated criminal defendant to receive 
a fair trial . . . by rendering him unable or 
unwilling to assist counsel,' " (quoting 
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 
1818-1819 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)). 
126 Id. at 2694 (citing Bonnie, "The 
Competence of Criminal Defendants: A 
Theoretical Reformulation," 10 Behav. 
Sci. & L. 291, 299 (1992)); R. Roesch 




To try, convict and punish one so 
helpless to defend himself contra-
venes fundamental principles of 
fairness and impugns the integrity 
of our criminal justice system. I 
cannot condone the decision to ac-
cept, without further inquiry, the 
self-destructive ''choice'' of a per-
son who was so deeply medicated 
and who might well have been se-
verely mentally ill. 127 
Justice Blackmun' s dissent in God-
inez is a powerful document ~~t 
speaks simultaneousl>' t~ the ~mpm­
cal realities of the crumnal tnal pro-
cess, the impact of mental ~lness a~d 
medication on a defendant s capacity 
for reasoned choice, and, perhaps, 
most important, the role of pretextu-
ality in the incompetency-to-stand-
trial process. 128 He rejects the formul-
istic approach of Justice Thomas~s 
majority opinion, weighs the perti-
nent social science evidence, and 
demonstrates how the trial record re-
flects the ''ambiguity' ' of the control-
ling colloquy between counsel and 
the trial judge. 
The underlying tensions of the case 
are exacerbated even further because 
the defendant had been sentenced to 
death. The Supreme Court has con-
sidered the relationship between 
mental illnes·s and the competency to 
be executed, 129 the relationship be-
tween mental retardation and the 
competency to be executed, 130 and, 
121 Id. at 2696. 
128 See 3 Perlin, note 1 supra, 
§ 14.07A (1994 pocket part); Perlin, 
''Pretexts,'' note 9 supra. 
129 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399 (1986); see 3 Perlin, note 1 supra, 
§§ 17.02-17.06; see generally Perlin, 
Jurisprudence, note 34 supra. 
130 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302 (1989); see 3 Perlin, note 1 supra, 
§§ 17.06A(1994pocketpart), 17.09; see 
generally Perlin, Jurisprudence, note 34 
supra. 
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more recently, has declined to con-
sider ·on the merits the constitutionali-
ty of medicating a defendant so as to 
make him competent to be exe-
cuted. 131 The decision in Godinez-
virtually guaranteeing less searching 
131 See Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 
38 (1990); see 3 Perlin, note 1 supra, 
§ 17 .06B (1994 pocket part); see general-
ly Perlin, Jurisprudence, note 34 supra. 
inquiries in cases involving defen-
dants of questionable compe-
tency132-will likely complicate even 
further this area of mental disability 
law jurisprudence. 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Day, 
998 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1993) (re-
jecting defendant's claim that the court 
should have conducted a competency 
hearing prior to allowing him to proceed 
prose). 
